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I. Introduction
Currently, dollar doom and gloom is thick in the air. Between its 
high in March 2020, immediately after the COVID-19 pandemic struck 
the global economy, and the end of the same calendar year, the broad 
dollar index fell by approximately 10 per cent. A wide variety of banks 
and forecasters expected – and expect – the trend to continue. As of late 
November 2020, ING forecast that the dollar would fall by an additional 
10 per cent in calendar year 2021 (Davies 2020). Citigroup forecast that 
the greenback would likely fall by a further 20 per cent in the course 
of the year (Reagan 2020). Writing in September 2020, Stephen Roach, 
formerly of Morgan Stanley and now at Yale University, suggested that 
the broad dollar index would fall by as much as 35 per cent by the end 
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The dollar fell by 10 per cent between its March 2020 high and 
the end of the calendar year, and many banks and forecasters 
expect it to fall further, by as much as 35 per cent in 2021. Dollar 
skeptics cite the end of safe-haven flows following the approval 
of COVID vaccines, the Federal Reserve’s aggressive quantitative 
easing, America’s twin deficits, and the rise of viable alternatives 
to the greenback. This article argues, in contrast, that this dollar 
pessimism is overdrawn.
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of 2021 (Roach 2020). This pessimism was grounded in a confluence of 
factors: the advent of effective COVID-19 vaccines, which will reverse 
safe-haven flows into the dollar; aggressive monetary and financial 
easing by the Federal Reserve; and America’s large budget and current 
account deficits.
Superimposed on these short-term issues is the long-held belief that 
the dollar is at risk of losing its preeminent international role. The 
greenback remains far-and-away the leading global currency. It still 
accounts for more than 60 per cent of total identified foreign exchange 
reserves, according to the IMF (2020). It accounts for more than 60 per 
cent of all debt securities marketed to international investors and more 
than 40 per cent of all foreign exchange turnover worldwide (ECB 2020).
Yet October 2020 was the first time that the share of payments 
through SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication) denominated in a non-dollar currency (in this case 
the euro) exceeded the share denominated in dollars (SWIFT 2020). The 
Trump Administrations efforts to weaponize the dollar – threatening 
countries failing to comply with U.S. sanctions against Iran and failing 
more generally to support U.S. foreign policy with loss of access to 
U.S. banks and dollar credit – may have accelerated this move toward 
other currencies.  More generally, countries tend to use and hold the 
currencies of their alliance partners (Eichengreen, Mehl and Chitu 
2019), and the United States has come to be regarded, in some circles 
at least, as a less reliable alliance partner. This newfound skepticism 
about the utility of the greenback arises against the backdrop of not 
just a euro that is increasingly seen as here to stay but also a renminbi 
whose emergence as an international currency is actively promoted 
by the Chinese authorities. Together these developments augur the 
possibility of further dollar depreciation as foreign users recognize the 
existence of alternatives and contemplate their options.
Stephen Roach, in the piece cited above, summarizes the argument. 
“I continue to expect this broad dollar index to plunge by as much as 
35 per cent by the end of 2021. This reflects three considerations: rapid 
deterioration in U.S. macroeconomic imbalances, the ascendancy of the 
euro and the renminbi a viable alternatives, and the end of that special 
aura of American exceptionalism that has given the dollar Teflon-like 
resilience for most of the post-World War II era.”
In this article I will argue, to the contrary, that this dollar doom and 
gloom is overdone. To paraphrase Ms. Prism in Oscar Wilde’s play 
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“The Importance of Being Ernest” (“Cecily, you will read your Political 
Economy in my absence. The chapter on the Fall of the Rupee you 
may omit.  It is somewhat too sensational.”), these tales of the dollar’s 
imminent demise are rather too sensational.
II. Safe Haven Flows
A first argument for why the dollar is destined to fall is the reversal 
of safe-haven flows following the announcement of a set of effective 
COVID-19 vaccines (see e.g. Financial Times 2020). The dollar is widely 
viewed as the preeminent safe-haven currency, defined as a currency 
that appreciates when uncertainty spikes. Its safe-haven status was 
illustrated most dramatically in late 2008, when it strengthened in the 
midst of the Global Financial Crisis despite the fact that the United 
States itself, as home to Lehman Brothers, was the foremost source of 
that crisis. The same reaction was evident in March 2020, when the 
dollar strengthened in response to the spread of COVID-19. 
Various rationales have been offered to explain this regularity (see the 
survey in Habib and Stracca 2011). The United States, as the world’s 
single largest economy, has extensive resources to deploy in response to 
whatever threat looms on the horizon, where those resources include a 
central bank able and willing to act as lender and liquidity provider of 
last resort. The U.S. treasury bond market is the single largest and most 
liquid financial market in the world, and there is nothing that investors 
value more in a crisis than liquidity. Relatedly, the U.S. is fully open 
financially, allowing investors around the world to take and close out 
positions at will.
It follows that with the announcement and regulatory approval of 
a set of COVID-19 vaccines, earlier safe-haven flows could reverse, 
leading to dollar depreciation. But while this effect might explain some 
of the dollar’s weakness in late 2020, when successful vaccine trials 
was announced, it does not obviously provide a rationale for predicting 
further greenback weakness in 2021. The information that there exist 
effective vaccines was already fully in the market; prices should have 
adjusted on the announcement, just as they adjust to other news 
(Eichengreen, Lafgarguette and Mehl 2017), not on the subsequent 
rollout.
To be sure, there remains residual uncertainty about the 
manufacture, distribution and take-up of vaccines. The most recent poll 
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of U.S. residents at the time of writing indicates that only 61 per cent 
of Americans are “very likely” to take an FDA-approved coronavirus 
vaccine as soon as it is available, reflecting doubts about its efficacy 
and safety (Beard 2020). Research on the response to earlier outbreaks 
suggests that lack of trust in government, scientists, and the safety 
and efficacy of vaccination is heightened by epidemic exposure, 
especially when the respondent lives in a country with a relatively 
weak government that failed to competently manage the public health 
emergency (Aksoy, Eichengreen and Saka 2020, Eichengreen, Aksoy 
and Saka 2020).
If this pattern is repeated in the context of COVID-19, then the 
risk of further spread of the disease and additional destabilizing 
economic and financial consequences may not be eliminated simply 
by the announcement of successful trials. Rather, governments will 
have to mobilize publicity campaigns and demonstrate the capacity to 
administer the vaccine. Their success, if it proves such, will become 
evident over time, in turn creating additional risk appetite and 
prompting flows out of the dollar. 
While there may be something to this point, the question is whether 
any residual uncertainty is sufficiently great to justify forecasts of a 
further 20 per cent fall of the dollar. This is, at the least, questionable.
III. Federal Reserve Balance-Sheet Expansion
A second popular basis for forecasting the dollar’s fall is the Federal 
Reserve’s rapid balance sheet expansion. The Fed was more aggressive 
than the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, or the People’s 
Bank of China in expanding its balance sheet immediately after the 
COVID-19 pandemic erupted in March 2020. Its total assets dearly 
doubled from roughly $4 trillion in March to nearly $7.5 trillion in a 
matter of months.
Other central banks similarly adopted asset purchase programs that 
caused their balance sheets to expand, but they moved more slowly and 
on a smaller scale. By the end of 2020, the PBOC’s balance sheet had 
increased in value by barely 10 per cent, the BOJ’s by a third, the ECB’s 
by two thirds (Yardini Research 2020). Monetarist theories of inflation 
suggest that relative inflation rates will reflect relative rates of credit 
creation by central banks. In turn, purchasing-power-parity theories of 
exchange rate determination suggest that the dollar exchange rate will 
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reflect relative inflation rates. 
The problem, of course, being that neither of these two theories has 
an especially good track record.  For more than a decade following the 
Global Financial Crisis, global inflation remained subdued in the face 
of what was regarded, by the standards of the time, as rapid credit 
expansion. Why the relationship between money and credit on the one 
hand and inflation on the other has broken down was and is contested. 
Some (e.g. Goodhart and Pradhan 2020) point to globalization and 
demography as together subduing wage inflation in particular. Others 
(e.g. Stansbury and Lawrence 2020) point to declining unionization and 
falling worker power. Whatever the explanation, however, there is no 
question that the anticipated inflation failed to materialize. 
While the absence of inflation in an environment of rapid credit 
creation is a recent phenomenon, the failure of purchasing power parity 
to explain exchange rate movements is of long standing (see e.g. Frenkel 
1981). The latter reflects the fact that the exchange rate is an asset 
price – it depends on the myriad factors affecting asset markets and in 
particular on expectations of how those same factors will evolve in the 
future – rather than moving to equate the cost of domestic and foreign 
goods. Exchange rates, in other words, do not move with relative rates 
of inflation.
In addition, although foreign central banks may have been slower 
initially than the Fed to respond to the COVID crisis, there is every 
reason to expect them to catch up. The ECB and BOJ are aware 
that the Fed’s relatively rapid balance sheet expansion has led to 
appreciation of their currencies (Dedola, Georgiadis, Grab and Mehl 
2020) – currency appreciation that they view as undesirable, given 
the weakness of their exports and economies (Rothko Research 2020). 
And if foreign central banks now catch up as expected, there will be no 
reason on these grounds to expect the dollar to weaken.
IV. Twin Deficits
Then there are America’s budget and current account deficits. 
That the current account deficit is the difference between domestic 
investment and domestic saving, by definition, creates a presumption 
that government dissaving (a budget deficit) will result in a current 
account deficit. This current account deficit will then have to be 
financed by importing capital from abroad. But attracting that capital 
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requires making U.S. assets more attractive to foreign investors by 
making them more of a bargain – that is to say, by cheapening the 
dollar. To again quote Roach (2020), “With personal saving likely to 
recede sharply in the months ahead and the federal budget deficit 
exploding…the plunge in net domestic saving in the second quarter of 
2020 is only a hint of what lies ahead…This will trigger a collapse in the 
U.S. current-account deficit. Lacking in saving and wanting to invest 
and grow, the U.S. must import surplus saving from abroad and run 
massive external deficits to attract foreign capital.” Since budget deficits 
and national dissaving will be ongoing, the argument concludes, so too 
will be the decline of the dollar.
This of course is the same “twin deficits hypothesis” widely invoked 
prior to the Global Financial Crisis by those predicting a dollar crash (see 
e.g. Roubini 2006). It is fair warning that the dollar didn’t crash then. 
There is similarly reason to doubt that it will crash now.
To be sure, the U.S. government will almost certainly continue 
running budget deficits for as far as the eye can see. There are some 
who argue that the U.S. should shift toward fiscal consolidation 
relatively soon in the interest of debt sustainability. Others (e.g. Furman 
and Summers 2020) point to the continued low level of interest rates as 
limiting debt servicing costs, and to expectations of low inflation going 
forward as reflecting weak private demand and indicative of the need 
for continued deficit spending in order to keep economic recovery on 
track. Either way, the historical record gives little reason to think that 
there will be an early return to budget balance in the United States.
But does this necessarily mean that the U.S. current account will 
move deep into deficit or that the dollar will depreciate?  U.S. public 
saving may have fallen, but private saving has risen. Part of the 
increase in the latter is a temporary lockdown effect: people can’t 
spend on holidays and dining out while quarantined. In addition, in 
the summer of 2020 U.S. households had their incomes supplemented 
by stimulus checks. The U.S. monthly personal saving rate rose to an 
extraordinary 33.7 per cent in April 2020, after which it fell back to 13.6 
per cent in October.
But 13.6 per cent is still high by the country’s historical standards: 
personal savings in the United States typically run in the range of 7 to 
8 per cent. This suggests that at least part of the increase in personal 
savings rates may be permanent. U.S. households have been reminded 
by the COVID-19 crisis of the inadequacy of their precautionary saving. 
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Federal Reserve research from before the crisis showed that 4 in 10 
Americans had too little savings to meet a hypothetical $400 expense 
(Federal Reserve 2019). Not being able to pay the rent or put food on the 
table after only weeks out of work due to COVID-19 has been a wake-
up call.
Past experience is consistent with this presumption that a searing 
experience, such as an economic crisis and a pandemic, can have 
a permanent impact on economic behavior. Malmandier and Nagel 
(2011) show that individuals who experienced the Great Depression 
behaved more conservatively financially for the balance of their lives. 
Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2013) show that growing up in a recession 
has analogous effects.  Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2014) show that 
exposure to the Global Financial Crisis increased the risk aversion of 
Italian investors. Dohmen, Lehmann and Pignatti (2016) show that 
such exposure renders individuals less willing to assume the risks 
associated with self-employment. There is at least some evidence (i.e. 
Aksoy, Eichengreen and Saka 2020) that the COVID crisis could have 
analogous effects.
Nor will investment be unaffected. (This is relevant because, recall, 
the change in the current account depends on both the change in 
investment and the change in saving.) There is good reason to think 
that big investment projects will remain on hold until firms have a 
clearer sense of the shape of the post-pandemic landscape. It is unlikely 
that they will rush to invest in inner-city office space, business hotels or 
long-distance airliners until they know how much of the shift to remote 
work is permanent and what the future portends for business travel 
(Bloom, Bond and van Reenen 2007). This uncertainty raises the option 
value of waiting (Dixit and Pindyck 1994).  At some point, of course, 
COVID-related uncertainty will be resolved, and investment will recover. 
But over the several-year horizon relevant for exchange-rate forecasting, 
there is unlikely to be an investment surge to blow a hole in the current 
account.
Subdued investment spending also appears to be what financial 
markets are anticipating. If market participants expected a sharp rise 
in investment, absolutely and relative to saving, then we would observe 
sharp increases in interest rates and treasury breakeven inflation rates. 
In fact, there have been only very modest movements in that direction.
Finally, even if the U.S. current account deficit does in fact widen, 
it does not automatically follow that the dollar must weaken to attract 
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foreign savings. The historical relationship between the current 
account and the dollar exchange rate is far from tight (Milesi-Ferreetti 
2008). In some periods, the dollar must depreciation to attract foreign 
investors, as posited by inter alia Roach.  But in other periods, U.S. 
assets are regarded as sufficiently attractive even at their prevailing 
foreign currency price to attract foreign capital in the requisite amounts 
(Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa 2005). Presumably, productive and 
remunerative investments are attractive to foreign investors. These may 
include even investments financed by government borrowing, in inter 
alia much needed physical infrastructure in the United States.
V. The Revenge of Geopolitics
Finally, there is the argument that the end of U.S. geopolitical 
dominance inevitably presages the dollar’s fall. No question, American 
global hegemony since World War II has been an important foundation 
stone of the dollar’s status as the leading global currency. Historically, 
investors have been confident about holding the currencies of countries 
able to secure their borders and repel foreign threats (Eichengreen 
2020) – countries that have more friends than enemies. Central banks 
and governments are inclined to hold as reserves the currencies of 
their alliance partners (Eichengreen, Mehl and Chitu 2019). Arguably 
America’s national security, but most certainly its alliances, have been 
diminished by President Donald Trump’s aggressive unilateralism. 
Other countries increasingly view the United States as a damaged 
democracy and unreliable alliance partner.
Moreover, the Trump Administration’s readiness to utilize the dollar 
as leverage for advancing its foreign policy goals has encouraged other 
countries to seek out alternatives, such as INSTEX (the Instrument in 
Support of trade Exchanges) in Europe (Didili 2019) and Russia and 
China’s ongoing efforts to reduce the share of the dollar in their bilateral 
clearing transactions – a share that has dropped from more than 90 
per cent in 2015 to less than 50 per cent in 2020 (Simes 2020). In this 
connection, it is widely argued, as in the Roach piece cited above, that 
there exist increasingly attractive alternatives to the dollar in the euro 
and the renminbi. It follows that traditional dollar users seeking to 
move away are free to do so.
Certainly, U.S. unilateralism, extending to reckless statements 
by members of the U.S. Congress that the country should consider 
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repudiating U.S. treasury debt held by the Chinese government (Kleefeld 
2020), encourages the search for alternatives. The question is whether 
serious alternatives in fact exist on the requisite scale.
The Euro Area, for its part, has successfully dispatched investor 
fears about the survival of its currency.  And the euro has gained 
considerable importance in cross-border payments, as noted in the 
reference to SWIFT above. It has made less progress, however, as a 
reserve currency and a substitute for the dollar as a source of safe 
assets. The constraint here, as shown by Eichengreen and Gros 
(2020), is the very limited supply of safe euro assets, both absolutely 
and compared to the stock of U.S. Treasury securities. In part this 
reflects that only a relatively small subset of European governments 
and multilaterals enjoy AAA ratings; the bonds of the remaining 
governments are not regarded as safe by central bank reserve 
managers. In part the problem is the traditionally bank-based nature 
of the European financial system, which makes for lots of bank loans 
and bank deposits but relatively few tradable securities. And in part it 
reflects the fact that many of the safe euro assets in question have been 
purchased by the European Central Bank in the course of quantitative 
easing or must be held by European banks and other financial 
institutions to meet their capital and other regulatory requirements. 
This of course means that they are not available to reserve managers 
and foreign investors outside the Euro Area.
The upshot is that total safe (AAA) euro assets, counting the bonds 
of both European governments and supranationals, came to just $4.7 
trillion at the end of 2019, compared to $16.8 trillion of AAA-rated U.S. 
Treasury bonds. If one subtracts the AAA-rated Euro Area bonds held 
by domestic central and commercial banks, which are not available to 
foreign investors, the $4.7 trillion falls to $2.9 trillion.
One can imagine various ways of relaxing this constraint. Gros 
and I propose that the European Central Bank should issue its own 
negotiable asset-backed certificates of deposit, effectively securitizing its 
deposits. Although similar proposals have been mooted before (see e.g. 
Boonstra 2019), there has as yet been no movement in this direction.
Alternatively, in the summer of 2020 the European Union agreed to 
issue €850 billion of its own (presumably AAA-rated) bonds, backed 
by the full faith and credit of EU members jointly. Again, however, 
€850 billion of securities are a drop in the bucket compared to the 
outstanding $16.8 trillion stock of negotiable U.S. Treasury bonds. And 
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whether this €850 billion represents Europe’s “Hamiltonian moment” 
– whether it is the first step down the road toward significantly greater 
issuance – is uncertain.
China’s efforts to internationalize the renminbi face a different set of 
constraints. The fact that China maintains a range of capital controls, 
and looks to retain them for the foreseeable future, limits the utility of 
the renminbi for financial transactions.  China can encourage its Belt 
& Road partners to settle their bilateral commercial transactions using 
the renminbi, since those partners are anxious for funds.  China has 
designated official clearing banks in financial centers around the world 
to smooth the settlement of renminbi-denominated transactions with 
local counterparties. The PBOC has established swap lines with scores 
of foreign central banks, in this case with the goal of encouraging 
foreign regulators, having now been rendered more confident about the 
ready availability of renminbi liquidity, to relax restrictions on position-
taking in the currency by local financial institutions. These measures 
appear to have had some effect: Song and Xia (2019) find that signing 
a RMB swap line with the PBOC significantly increases the number, 
value and proportion of the RMB in cross-border trade settlements. 
In addition, China has selectively relaxed its restrictions on capital-
account transactions by establishing so-called “stock connects” and 
“bond connects” and otherwise allowing onshore financial investment 
by designated foreign investors.
But, notwithstanding these financial measures, a more fundamental 
political constraint remains.  Every leading international and reserve 
currency in history has been the currency of a political democracy or 
republic. This is true not just of the U.S. dollar and the British pound 
sterling before it but also of the guilder, the currency of the Dutch 
Republic with its representative Estates-General, and before that of 
the republican city states of Genoa, Venice and Florence with their 
city assemblies. This is not coincidental.  Investors – private investors 
and also central bank reserve managers – expect reassurance that 
their assets will not be expropriated. More generally, they look to 
the existence of checks and balances on the arbitrary application 
of executive power in the reserve-currency country. Republics and 
democracies have representative assemblies in which the creditors, 
together with others, have political voice. They constitute a source 
of checks and balances. China, in practice, has been moving in the 
opposite direction, of course, concentrating additional authority in the 
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hands of its chief executive.
This last observation speaks to the question of whether a Chinese 
central bank digital currency, or CBDC, would be a game changer. 
Every indication points to the likelihood that China will be the first 
major country to roll out a CBDC. A fully digital renminbi would 
represent a modest but significant reduction in the cost of cross-
border transactions, making the renminbi more attractive as a unit 
for payments, which in turn would help to make it more attractive 
in general. But with lower costs and greater convenience may come 
questions about security.  Foreign firms and banks – especially central 
banks – will worry whether their transactions are anonymous and 
whether their data is secure.
The same may be true of commercial entities. A survey of Korean 
merchants by Yonhap cites just such privacy concerns. “If people from 
other countries make widespread use of the ‘digital yuan’, centrally 
managed by the People’s Bank of China,” it notes, “it is likely that the 
usage will be exposed to Chinese authorities” (Erazo 2020).  Significant 
institutional reform in China may be required to change this perception 
and overcome the associated resistance. And it is not clear when, or 
even if, such fundamental change will be forthcoming.
VI. Conclusion
Forecasts of the dollar’s secular decline and loss of international 
currency status remind one of the quip popularly attributed to the 
American humorist Mark Twain: “Reports of my death are greatly 
exaggerated.” A safe and effective COVID-19 vaccine that is widely taken 
up may staunch safe-haven flows into the greenback, but this alone 
would be insufficient to generate a secular decline in the currency’s 
value or loss of its preeminent global status. Aggressive easing by the 
Federal Reserve might be thought to presage future depreciation, but 
foreign central banks are reluctant to see their own currencies rise 
significantly; in the current low-inflation environment, they are likely 
to match the Fed, open market purchase for open market purchase. 
The United States may continue to run large budget deficits for a 
considerable period into the future, but budget deficits are no guarantee 
of current account deficits. Moreover, current account deficits are no 
guarantee of dollar depreciation. Finally, while U.S. unilateralism may 
have encouraged the search for alternatives to the dollar, there are 
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significant constraints on the large-scale substitution of euros and 
renminbi, in the first case financial, in the second case political.
Forecasting exchange rates may be a fool’s game, but for all these 
reasons it would be foolish to bet on the dollar’s continued decline.
(Received 10 December 2020; Accepted 10 January 2021)
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